





Center for Research on Economic and Social Theory
CREST Working Paper









Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109

Page 1















*Parts of this chapter use material from Rubinstein [1987], a survey
of sequential bargaining models. Parts of Sections 5, 6, 7 and 8 are based on
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John Nash's [1950] path-breaking paper introduces the bargaining problem as
follows:
"A two-person bargaining situation involves two individuals who have
the opportunity to collaborate for mutual benefit in more than one
way." (p. 155)
With such a definition, nearly all human interaction can be seen as bargaining
of one form or another. To say anything meaningful on the subject, it is
necessary to narrow the scope of the inquiry. We-follow Nash in assuming that
"the two individuals are highly rational,...each can accurately
compare his desires for various things,...they are equal in
bargaining skill."
In addition we assume that the procedure by means of which agreement is
reached is both clear-cut and unambiguous. This allows the bargaining problem
to be modeled and analyzed as a noncooperative game.
The target of such a noncooperative theory of bargaining is to find
theoretical predictions of what agreement, if any, will be reached by the
bargainers. One hopes thereby to explain the manner in which the bargaining
outcome depends on the parameters of the bargaining problem and to shed light
on the meaning of some of the verbal concepts which are used when bargaining
is discussed in ordinary language. However, the theory has only peripheral
relevance to such questions as:
What is a just agreement?
How would a reasonable arbiter settle a dispute?
What is the socially optimal deal?
Nor is the theory likely to be of more than background interest to those who
write manuals on practical bargaining techniques. Such questions as
How can I improve my bargaining skills?
How do bargainers determine what is jointly feasible?
are psychological issues that the narrowing of the scope of the inquiry is
designed to exclude.
Cooperative bargaining theory (Chapter ???) differs mainly in that the
bargaining procedure is left unmodeled. Cooperative theory therefore has to
operate from a poorer informational base and hence its fundamental assumptions
are necessarily abstract in character. As a consequence, cooperative solution
concepts are often difficult to evaluate. Sometimes they may have more than
one viable interpretation, and this can lead to confusion if distinct
interpretations are not clearly separated. In this chapter we follow Nash in
adopting an interpretation of cooperative solution concepts that attributes
the same basic aims to cooperative as to noncooperative theory. That is to
say, we focus on interpretations in which, to quote Nash (1953],
"the two approaches to the (bargaining] problem.. .are complementary;
each helps to justify and clarify the other." (p. 129)
This means in particular that what we have to say on cooperative solution
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concepts is not relevant to interpretations which seek to address questions
like those given above which are specifically excluded from our study.
Notice that we do not see cooperative and noncooperative theory as rivals. It
is true that there is a sense in which cooperative theory is "too general";
but equally there is a sense in which noncooperative theory is "too special".
Only rarely will the very concrete procedures studied in noncooperative theory
be observed in practice. As Nash [1953] observes,
"Of course, one cannot represent all possible bargaining devices as
moves in the noncooperative game. The negotiation process must be
formalized and restricted, but in such a way that each participant is
still able to utilize all the essential strengths of his position."
(p. 129)
Even if one makes good judgments in modeling the essentials of the bargaining
process, the result may be too cumbersome to serve as a tool in applications,
where what is required is a reasonably simple mapping from the parameters of
the problem to a solution outcome. This is what cooperative theory supplies.
But which of the many cooperative solution concepts is appropriate in a given
context, and how should it be applied? For answers to such questions, one may
look to noncooperative theory for guidance. It is in this sense that we see
cooperative and noncooperative theory as complementary.
2. A sequential bargaining nodel
The archetypal bargaining problem is that of "dividing the dollar" between two
players. However, the discussion can be easily interpreted broadly to fit a
large class of bargaining situations. The set of feasible agreements is
identified with A - [0,1]. The two bargainers, players 1 and 2, have opposing
preferences over A. When a > b, 1 prefers a to b and 2 prefers b to a. Who
gets how much?
The idea that the information so far specified is not sufficient to determine
the bargaining outcome is very old. For years, economists tended to agree
that further specification of a bargaining solution would need to depend on
the vague notion of "bargaining ability". Even von Neumann and Morgenstern
[1944] suggested that the bargaining outcome would necessarily be determined
by unmodeled psychological properties of the players.
Nash [1950, 1953] broke away from this tradition. His agents are fully
rational. Once their preferences are given, other psychological issues are
irrelevant. The bargaining outcome in Nash's models is determined by the
players' attitudes towards risk--i.e. their preferences over lotteries in
which the prizes are taken from the set of possible agreements together with a
pre-determined "disagreement point".
A sequential bargaining theory attempts to resolve the indeterminacy by
explicitly modeling the bargaining procedure as a sequence of offers and
counter-offers. In the context of such models, Cross [1969] remarks, "If it
did not matter when the parties agreed, it would not matter if they agreed at
all". This suggests that the players' time preferences may be highly relevant
to the outcome. In what follows, who gets what depends exclusively on how
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patient each player is.
The following procedure is familiar from street markets and bazaars all over
the world. The bargaining consists simply of a repeated exchange of offers.
Formally, we study a model in which all events take place at one of the times
t in a prespecified set T - (0, t 1 , t 2 , ... ), where (ta) is strictly
increasing. The players alternate in making offers, starting with player 1.
An offer x, made at time tA, may be accepted or rejected by the other player.
If it is accepted, the game ends with the agreed deal being implemented at
time ta. This outcome is denoted by (x,tD). If the offer is rejected, the
rejecting player makes a counter-offer at time t 1 . And so on. Nothing
binds the players to offers they have made in the past, and no predetermined
limit is placed on the time that may be expended in bargaining. In principle,
a possible outcome of the game is therefore perpetual disagreement or impasse.
We denote this outcome by D.
Suppose that, in this model, player 1 could make a commitment to hold out for
a or more. Player 2 could then do no better than to make a commitment to
hold out for 1-a or better. The result would be-a Nash equilibrium
sustaining an agreement on a. The indeterminacy problem would therefore
remain. However, we follow Schelling [1960] in being skeptical about the
extent to which such commitments can genuinely be made. A player may make
threats about his last offer being final, but the opponent can dismiss such
threats as mere bombast unless it would actually be in the interests of the
threatening player to carry out his threat if his implicit ultimatum were
disregarded. In such situations, where threats need to be credible to be
effective, we replace Nash equilibrium by Selten's notion of subgame-perfect
equilibrium (Chapter ???).
The first to investigate the alternating offer procedure was Stahl [1967,
1972, 1988]. He studied the subgame-perfect equilibria of such time-
structured models by using backwards induction in finite horizon modela.
Where the horizons in his models are infinite, he postulates non-stationary
time preferences which lead to the existence-of a "critical period" at which
one player prefers to yield rather than to continue, independently of what
might happen next. This creates a "last interesting period" from which one
can start the backwards induction. (For further comment, see Stahl [1988].)
In the infinite horizon models studied below, different techniques are
required to establish the existence of a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium.
Much has been written on procedures in which all the offers are made by only
one of the two bargainers. These models assign all the bargaining power to
the party who makes the offers. Such an asymmetric set-up does not fit very
comfortably within the bargaining paradigm as usually understood and so we do
not consider models of this type in the current paper.
Impatience
Players are assumed to be impatient with the unproductive passage of time.
The times in the set T at which offers are made are restricted to te - nr (n -
0,1,2,... ), where r > 0 is the length of one period of negotiation. Except
where specifically noted, we take r - 1 to simplify algebraic expressions.
Rubinstein [1982] imposes the following conditions on the players' (complete,
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transitive) time preferences. For a and b in A, for s and t in T, and for i -
1, 2:
(TP1) a < b implies (a,t) >1 (b,t) and (b,t) >2 (a,t)
(TP2) 0 < a < 1 and s < t imply that (a,s) >i (a,t) >i D
(TP3) (a,s) 2, (b,s + r) if and only if (a,t) >i (b,t + r)
(TP4) the graphs of the relations 2, are closed.
These conditions are sufficient to imply the existence of utility function
representations in which t 1 (D) - " 2 (D) - 0, " 1(a,t) - 0 1(a)6i and " 2 (a,t) -
42(1 - a)6t, where the functions 4 : [0,1] -f [0,1] are strictly increasing and
continuous, and 0 < 61 < 1 (see Fishburn/Rubinstein [1982]). Sometimes we may
take as primitives the "discount factors" 61. However, note that if we start,
as above, with the preferences as primitives, then the number 6 may be
chosen arbitrarily in the range (0,1). The associated discount rates pi are
then given by 61 - e~pi
To these conditions, we add the requirement:
(TPO) for each a e A there exists b e A such that (b,0) -i (a,r).
By (TPO) we have 01(0) - 0; without loss of generality, we take Oi(l) - 1.
The function f: [0,1] - [0,1] defined by f(u 1 ) - 42(1 - 1 1 (u 1 )) is useful. A
deal reached at-time 0 that assigns utility u1 to player 1 assigns u2 - f(u 1 )
to player 2. More generally, the set Ut of utility pairs available at time t
is
(1) Ut - {(ui, f(u1)6 ) : 0 s ul s 1).
Note that a feature of this model is that all subgames in which a given player
makes the first offer have the same strategic structure.
Our goal is to characterize the subgame-perfect-equilibria of this game. We
begin by examining a pair of stationary strategies in which both players
always plan to do the same in strategically equivalent subgames, regardless of
the history of events that must have taken place for the subgame to have been
reached. Consider two possible agreements a* and b*, and let u* and v* be the
utility pairs that result from the implementation of these agreements at time
0. Let sl be the strategy of 1 which requires him always to offer a* and to
accept an offer of b if and only if b a b*. Similarly, let s2 be the strategy
of 2 which requires him always to offer b* and to accept an offer of a if and
only if a s a*. The pair (sls2) is a subgame-perfect equilibrium if and only
if
(2) v* - S1u*_ and u2* - 62v -
In checking that (s1's2) is a subgame-perfect equilibrium, observe that each
player is always offered precisely the utility that he will get if he refuses
the offer and si and s2 continue to be used in the subgame that ensues.
Notice that (2) admits a solution if and only if the equation
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(3) f(x) - 62 f(x6 1 )
has a solution. This is assured under our assumptions because f is
continuous, f(O) - 1 and f(l) - 0.
Each solution to (2) generates a different subgame-perfect equilibrium. Thus,
the uniqueness of a solution to (2) is a necessary condition for the
uniqueness of a subgame-perfect equilibrium in the game.
In the following we will assume that
(TP5) (2) has a unique solution.
In Rubinstein [1982], this is ensured with the condition
(TP5*) (a + a,r) - (a,0), (b + p,r) - (b,0) and a < b implies that a < p6.
This has the interpretation that the more you get_, the more you have to be
compensated for delay in getting it. A weak sufficient condition for the
uniqueness of the solution for (2) is that 41 and 02 be concave. (This
condition is far from necessary. It is enough, for example, that log 01 and
log 02 be concave.)
Result 1 (Rubinstein, 1982) Under assumptions (TPO)-(TP5) the bargaining game
has a unique sub-game-perfect equilibrium. In this equilibrium, agreement is
reached immediately, and the players' utilities satisfy (2).
Alternative versions of Rubinstein's proof appear in Binmore [1987b) and
Shaked/Sutton [1984]. The following proof of Shaked and Sutton is especially
useful for extensions and modifications of the theorem.
Proof: Without loss of generality, we take r - 1.
Let the supremum of all subgame-perfect equilibrium payoffs to player 1 be M1
and the infimum be mi. Let the corresponding quantities for player 2 in the
companion game, in which the roles of 1 and 2 are reversed, be M2 and m2 . We
will show that mi - u* and H2 - v2, where u* and v* are uniquely defined by
(2). An analogous argument shows that M1 - u* and m2 - v*. It follows that
the equilibrium payoffs are uniquely determined. To see that this implies
that the equilibrium strategies are unique, notice that, after every history,
the proposer's offer must be accepted in equilibrium. If, for example, player
l's demand of u* were refused, he would get at most 61 < u*.
Since u* is a subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome by the construction given
above, in 1 s u* and M2~ -~ We now show that (i) S 2M2 a f(m1 ) and (ii) M2 i
f(6Sim 1).
(i): Observe that if 2 refuses the opening offer, then the companion game -
will be played from time r - 1. If equilibrium strategies are played in this
game, 2 gets no more than 62M2. Player 2's equilibrium behavior at time t - 0
must therefore include accepting any offer that assigns 2 a payoff strictly
greater than 62M2. Player 1 can therefore guarantee himself any payoff less
than f'(6 2M2 ) . Thus mn1 f 1 (62 M2 ).-
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(ii): In the companion game, player 1 can guarantee himself any payoff less
than Mimn by refusing player 2's opening offer (provided equilibrium
strategies are used thereafter). Thus M2 f(6 1m1).
The uniqueness of (ut, v2) satisfying (2) is expressed in Figure 1
by the fact that the curves f(6 1u1) - u2 and f 1 (62u2) - u1  intersect only
at (u t, v). From (i) and ml s ut, (m 1 , M2) lies in region (i) . From
(ii) and M2 vz, (mi, M2) lies in region (ii). Hence (ml, M2) -
(u , V). Similarly (Mi, m 2 ) - (ut , vt) .
Figure 1
Shrinking cakes
Binmore's [1985] geometric characterization (see Figure 2) applies to any
preferences, whether or not they satisfy the stationarity assumption (TP3).
The "cake" available at time t is identified with a set Ut of utility pairs
which is assumed to be closed, bounded above and to have a connected Pareto
frontier. It i-s also assumed to shrink over time. This means that if s s t,
then, for each y e Ut, there exists x E U" satisfying x > y.
Figure 2
The construction begins by truncating the game to a finite number n of stages.
Figure 2 shows how a set E of payoff vectors is constructed from the
truncated game in the case when n is odd. The construction when n is even is
similar. The set of all subgame-perfect equilibrium payoff vectors is shown
to be the intersection of all such Em. Since the sets E are nested, their
intersection is also their limit as n - w. The methodology reveals that,
when there is a unique equilibrium outcome, this must be the limit of the
equilibrium outcomes in the finite horizon models obtained by calling a halt
to the bargaining process at some pre-determined time to. In fact, the finite
horizon equilibrium outcome in Figure 2 is the point m.
Discounting
A very special case of the time preferences covered by Result 1 occurs when
01(a) - #4(a) - a (0 < a s 1). Reverting to the case of an arbitrary r > 0,
we have u 1 - ( -6)/(1 - 6162) -+ p/(p1 + p2) as r -+ 0+. When 61 - 62 it
follows that the players share the available surplus of 1 equally in the
limiting case when the interval between successive proposals is negligible.
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If 61 decreases, so does player l's share. This is a general result in the
model: it always pays to be more patient. More precisely, define a: to be at
least as patient preference relation than z if whenever (y,0) >i (x,l) we
have (y,O) 21 (x,l). Then player 1 always gets at least as much in
equilibrium when his preference relation is 2 than when it is zi (Rubinstein
[1987]).
Fixed costs
Rubinstein [1982] characterizes the subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes in
the alternating offers model under the hypotheses (TP1) - (TP4) and a weak
version of (TP5*). These conditions also cover another interesting case when
each of the players incurs a fixed cost ci > 0 for each unit of time that
elapses without an agreement being reached. Suppose, in particular, that
their respective utilities for the outcome (a,t) are a - clt and 1 - a - c2t.
It follows from Rubinstein [1982] that, if c1 < c2 , the only subgame-perfect
equilibrium assigns the whole surplus to 1. If ci > c2 , then 1 obtains only
c2 in equilibrium. If c - c2 - c < 1, then iany subgame-perfect equilibria
exist. If c is small (c <_1/3), some of these equilibria involve delay in-
agreement being reached.. That is, equilibria exist in which one or more
offers get refused. It should be noted that, even when the interval r
between successive proposals becomes negligible (r + 0+), the equilibrium
delays do not necessarily become negligible.
Stationarity, Efficiency and Uniqueness
We have seen that, when (2) has a unique solution, the game has a unique
subgame-perfect equilibrium which is stationary and that its use results in
the game ending immediately.
The efficiency of the equilibrium is not a consequence of the requirement of
perfection by itself. As we have just seen, when multiple equilibria exist,
(that is when (2) has more than one solution) some of these may call for some
offers to be refused before agreement is reached so that the final outcome
need not be Pareto-efficient. It is sometimes -suggested that rational players
with complete information must necessarily reach a Pareto-efficient outcome
when bargaining costs are negligible. This example shows that the suggestion
is questionable.
Some authors consider it adequate to restrict attention to stationary
equilibria on the grounds of simplicity. We do not make any such restriction,
since we believe that, for the current model, such a restriction is hard to
justify. Strategies in sequential games are more than plans of how to play
the game. They include also a description of the beliefs the players have
about what a player would do if he were to deviate from his own plan of
action. (We are not talking here about beliefs as formalized in the notion of
sequential equilibrium, but of the beliefs built into the definition of a
strategy in an extensive form game.) Therefore, a stationarity assumption.
does more than attribute simplicity of behavior to the players: it also makes
players' beliefs insensitive to past events. For example, stationarity
requires that, if player 1 is supposed to offer a 50:50 split in equilibrium,
but has always demanded an out-of-equilibrium 60:40 split in the past, then
player 2 still continues to hold the belief that player 1. will offer the 50:50
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split in the future. For a more detailed discussion of this point see
Rubinstein [1988].
Finally, it should be noted that the uniqueness condition of Result 1 can fail
if the set A from which players choose their offers is sufficiently
restricted. Suppose, for example, that the dollar to be divided can only be
split into a whole number of cents, so that A - (0, .01,..., .99, 1). If
41(a) - 42 (a) - a and 61 - 62 - 6 > .99, then any division of the dollar can be
supported as the outcome of a subgame-perfect equilibrium. Does this
conclusion obviate the usefulness of Result 1? This depends on the
circumstances in which it is proposed to apply the result. If the grid on
which the players locate values of 6 is finer than that on which they locate
values of a, then the bargaining problem remains indeterminate. Our judgment,
however, is that the reverse is usually the case.
Outside options
When bargaining takes place it is usually open to either player to abandon the
negotiation table if things are not going well, to take up the best option
available elsewhere. This feature can easily be incorporated into the model
analyzed in Result 1 by allowing the players to opt out whenever they have
just refused an offer. Let us suppose that opting out at time t yields a
payoff of ei6it to player i. The important point is that, under the
conditions of Result 1, the introduction of such exit opportunities is
irrelevant to the equilibrium bargaining outcome when e1 < 61ui and e2 <
62v2. In this case the players always prefer to continue bargaining rather
than to opt out. The next result exemplifies this point.
Result 2 (Binnore/Shaked/Sutton, 1988) Take 0 1(a) - #2(a) - a (0 s a s 1) and
61 - 62 - 6. If el + e2 < 26/(1 + 6) then there exists a unique subgame-
perfect equilibrium in which neither player exercises his outside option. It
assigns 1/(1 + 6) to player 1 unless el > 6/(1 + 6) or e2 > 6/(1 + 6). If
e2 > 6/(l + 6), player 1 gets 1 - e2. Otherwise he gets 1 - 6(1 - e1 ). 
As modeled above, a player cannot leave the table without first listening to
an offer from his opponent, who therefore always has a last chance to save the
situation. This seems to capture the essence of traditional face-to-face
bargaining. Shaked [1987] finds multiple equilibrium if a player's
opportunity for exit occurs, not after a refusal by himself, but after a
refusal by his opponent. He has in mind "high tech" markets in which binding
deals are made quickly over the telephone. Intuitively, a player then has the
opportunity to accompany the offer with a threat that the offer is final.
Shaked shows that equilibria exist in which the threat is treated as credible
and others in which it is not. When outside options are mentioned later, it
is the face-to-face model that is intended. But it is important to bear in
mind how sensitive the model can be to apparently minor changes in the
structure of the game. For a further discussion of the "outside option" issue
see Sutton [1986] and Bester [1988].
Finally, reference needs to be made to the work of Harsanyi and Selten
(1988, p.243]. Although the bargaining model they consider is not strictly
comparable with the model used in deriving Result 2, it is worrying that they
should obtain such strikingly different conclusions about how outside options
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should be expected to influence the bargaining outcome. Clearly further
research on the many possible bargaining models that can be constructed in
this context is much needed.
Risk
Binmore/Rubinstein/Wolinsky (1986] reinterpret the alternating offers model by
supposing that the players are indifferent to the passage of time but face a
probability p that any refused offer will be the last that can be made. The
fear of getting trapped in a bargaining impasse is then replaced by the
possibility that intransigence will lead to a breakdown of the negotiating
process due to the intervention of some external factor. The extensive form
in the new situation is somewhat different from the one described above: at
the end of each period the game may end with a breakdown outcome with
probability p. Moreover, the functions 41 and #2 need to be reinterpreted as
von Neumann and Morgenstern utility functions. That is to say, they are
derived from the players' attitudes to risk rather than from their attitudes
to time. The conclusion is essentially the same as in the time-based model.
We denote the breakdown payoff vector by b and replace the discount factors by
1 - p. Since account needs to be taken of the fact that b may not be located
at the origin, (2) is replaced by
(4) v* - b1 - (1 - p)(u* - b) and u* - b2 - (1 - p)(v* - b2),
where u* is the agreement payoff vector when player 1 makes the first offer
and v* is its analog for the case in which it is 2 who makes the first offer.
More than two players
Result 1 does njt extend to the case when there are more than two players, as
the following three-player example of Shaked demonstrates.
Three players rotate in making proposals a - (a1 ,a 2 ,a3 ) on how to split a cake
of size one. We require that al + a2 + a3 - 1 and a1 > 0 (i - 1,23). A
proposal a accepted at time t is evaluated as worth ai6 by the i player. A
proposal a made by the jth player at time t is first considered by player
j + 1 (mod 3) who may accept or refuse. If he accepts, player j + 2 (mod 3)
may accept or refuse. If both accept, the game ends and the proposal a is
implemented. Otherwise player j + 1 (mod 3) makes the next proposal at time
t + 1.
Let 1/2 s 6 < 1. Then, for every proposal a, there exists a subgame-perfect
equilibrium in which a is accepted immediately. We describe the equilibrium
in terms of the four commonly held "states (of mind)" a, e1 , e2 and e3 , where
ei is the i- unit vector. In state y, each player i makes the proposal y and
accepts the proposal z if and only if z1 a Sy1 . The initial state is a.
Transitions occur only after a proposal has been made, beor the response.
If, in state y, player i proposes z with z1 > y1 then the state becomes ed,
where j - i is a player for whom ze < 1/2. Such a player j exists, and the
requirement that 6 m 1/2 guarantees that it is optimal for him to reject
player l's proposal.
Efforts have been made to reduce the indeterminacy in the n-player case by
changing the game or the solution concept. One obvious result is that, if
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attention is confined to stationary (one-state) strategies, then the unique
subgame-perfect equilibrium assigns the cake in the proportions 1:6:...:5"~1
The same result follows from restricting the players to have continuous
expectations about the future (Binmore [1986]).
3. The Nash prograu
The ultimate aim of what is nowadays called the "Nash program" (see Nash
[1953]) is to classify the various institutional frameworks within which
negotiation takes place and to provide a suitable "bargaining solution" for
each class. As a test of the suitability of a particular solution concept for
a given type of institutional framework, Nash proposed that attempts be made
to reduce the available negotiation ploys within that framework to moves
within a formal bargaining game. If the rules of the bargaining game
adequately capture the salient features of the relevant bargaining
institutions, then a "bargaining solution" proposed for use in the presence of
these institutions should appear as an equilibrium outcome of the bargaining
game.
The leading solution concept for bargaining situations is the Nash bargaining
solution (see Nash [1950]). The idea belongs in cooperative game theory. A
"bargaining problem" is a pair (U,q) in which U is a set of pairs of von
Neumann and Morgenstern utilities representing the possible deals available to
the bargainers, and q is a point in U interpreted by Nash as the status quo.
The Nash bargaining solution is a point at which the Nash product
(5) (ul - q1)(u 2 - q2)
is maximized subject to the constraints u E U and u a q. Usually it is
assumed that U is convex, closed and bounded above to ensure that the Nash
bargaining solution is uniquely defined, but convexity is not strictly
essential in what follows.
When is such a Nash bargaining solution appropriate for a two-player
bargaining environment involving alternating offers? Consider the model we
studied in the previous section, in which there is a probability p of
breakdown after any refusal. We have the following result. (See also
McLennan [1982], Moulin [1982], Binmore/Rubinstein/Wolinsky [1986].)
Result 3 (Binmore, 1987a) When a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium exists
for each p sufficiently close to one, the bargaining problem (U,q), in which U
is the set of available utility pairs at time 0 and q - b is the breakdown
utility pair, has a unique Nash bargaining solution. This is the limiting
value of the subgame-perfect equilibrium payoff pair as p -+ 0+.
Proof. To prove the concluding sentence, it is necessary only to observe from
(4) that u* E U and v* e U lie on the same contour of (u - b')-(u - b ,) and
that u* - v* -+ (0, 0) as p -+ 0+.
U
We can obtain a similar result in the time-based alternating offers model when
the length i of a bargaining period approaches 0. One is led to this case by
considering two objections to the alternating offers model. The first is
based on the fact that the equilibrium outcome favors player 1 in that u* >
v* and u* < v*. This reflects player l's first-mover advantage. The.
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objection evaporates when t is small and so "bargaining frictions" are
negligible. It then becomes irrelevant who goes first. The second objection
concerns also the reasons why players abide by the rules. Why should a player
who has just refused an offer patiently wait until a period of length r > 0
before making a counter-offer? If he were able to abbreviate the waiting
time, he would respond immediately. Considering the limit as v -+ 0+, removes
some of the bite of the second objection in that the players need no longer be
envisaged as being constrained by a rigid, exogenously determined timetable.
Figure 3
Figure 3 illustrates the solutions u* and v* of equations (2) in the case when
6, and 62 are replaced by 6S and 62 and pi - -log 6i. It is clear from the
figure that, when r approaches zero, u and v* both approach the point n* in U
at which uf111uz1'2 is maximized. Although we are not dealing with von
Neumann and Morgenstern utilities, it is convenient to describe n* as being
located at an asymmetric Nash bargaining solution of U relative to a status
quo q located at the impasse payoff pair (0, 0). (See Chapter ??? and Roth
[1978].)
Such an interpretation should not be pushed beyond its limitations. In
particular, with our assumptions on time preferences, it has already been
pointed out that, for rD 5 in (0,1), there exist functions w and w2 such
that w1 (a)6t and w2 (1 - a)6t are utility representations of the players' time
preferences. Thus if the utility representation is tailored to the bargaining
problem, then the equilibrium outcome in the limiting case as v -+ 0+ is the
symmetric Nash bargaining solution for the utility functions w1 and w2 .
This discussion of how the Nash bargaining solution may be implemented by
considering limiting cases of sequential noncooperative bargaining models
makes it natural to ask whether other bargaining solutions from cooperative
game theory can be implemented using parallel techniques. We mention only
Moulin's [1984] work on implementing the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. (See
Chapter ??? and Kalai and Smorodinsky [1975].) Moulin's model begins with an
auction to determine who makes the first proposal. The players simultaneously
announce probabilities p1 and p2 . If p1 > p2 , then player 1 begins by
proposing an outcome a. If player 2 rejects a, then he makes a counter-
proposal b. If player 1 rejects b, then the status quo q results. If player
1 accepts b, a referee organizes a lottery which yields b with probability p1
and q with probability 1 -p 1 . (The tie-breaking device used in the auction is
irrelevant.) The natural criticism is-that it is not clear to what extent
such an "auctioning of fractions of a dictatorship" qualifies as bargaining in
the sense that this is normally understood.
Econoumic mdeling
The preceding section provides some support for the use of the Nash bargaining
solution in economic modeling. One advantage of a noncooperative approach is
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that it offers some insight into how the various economic parameters that may
be relevant should be assimilated into the bargaining model when the
environment within which bargaining takes place is complicated
(Binmore/Rubinstein/Wolinsky [1986]). In the following, we draw together some
of the relevant considerations.
Assume that the players have von Neumann and Morgenstern utilities of the form
u1(a)St. Consider the placing of the status quo. In cooperative bargaining
theory this is interpreted as the utility pair that results from a failure to
agree. But such a failure to agree may arise in more than one way. We shall,
in fact, distinguish three possible ways:
a. A player may choose to abandon the negotiations at time t. -Both players
are then assumed to seek out their best outside opportunities, thereby
deriving utilities eis. Notice that it is commonplace in modeling wage
negotiations to ignore timing considerations and to use the Nash
_ bargaining solution with the status quo placed at the "exit point" e.
b. The negotiations may be interrupted by the intervention of an exogenous
random event which occurs in each period of length r with probability Ar.
If the negotiations get broken off in this way at time t, each player
obtains utility b16i.
c. The negotiations may continue for ever without interruption or agreement,
which is the outcome denoted by D in Section 2. As in Section 2,
utilities are normalized so that each player then gets di - 0.
Assume that the three utility pairs e, b and d, satisfy 0 - d < b < e.
When contemplating the use of an asymmetric Nash bargaining solution in the
context of an alternating offers model for the "frictionless" limiting case
when r - 0+, the principle is that the status quo is placed at the utility
pair q that results from the use of impasse strategies. Thus, if we ignore
the exit point e then
qi - lim +IZbiS' Ar(1- Ar)4 - Abi/(A + Pi) (i - 1,2).
The (symmetric) Nash bargaining solution of the problem in which (q 1 , q 2) is
the status quo point is the maximizer of u1u2, where a+ - 1/(A + pj) (i.e.
it is the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution in which the "bargaining power"
of player i is ai). This reflects the fact that both time and risk are
instrumental in forcing an agreement.
It is instructive to look at two extremal cases. The first occurs when A is
small compared with the discount rates p1 and p 2 so that it is the time costs
of disagreement that dominate. The status quo goes to d and the bargaining
powers become l/p 1 . The second case occurs when p1 and p2 are both small
compared with A so that rjik costs dominate. This leads to a situation closer
to that originally envisaged by Nash [1950]. The status quo goes to the
breakdown point b and the bargaining powers approach equality so that the Nash
bargaining solution becomes symmetric.
As to the exit point, the principle is that its value is ireevn unless at
least one player's outside option e1 exceeds the appropriate Nash bargaining
payoff. There will be no agreement if this is true for both players. When it
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is true for just one of the players, he gets his outside option and the other
gets what remains of the surplus.
Note finally that the above considerations concerning bargaining over stocks
translate immediately to the case of bargaining over flows. In bargaining
over the wage ta during a strike, for example, the status quo payoffs should
be the impasse flows to the two parties during the strike.
4. Commitment and concession
A commitment is understood to be an action available to an agent that
constrains his choice set at future times in a manner beyond his power to
revise. Schelling [1960] has emphasized, with many convincing examples, how
difficult it is to make genuine commitments in the real world to take-it-or-
leave-it bargaining positions. It is for such reasons that subgame-perfect
equilibrium and other refinements now supplement Nash equilibrium as the basic
tool in noncooperative game theory. However, when it is realistic to consider
take-it-or-leave-it offers or threats, these will clearly be overwhelmingly
important. Nash's [1953] demand game epitomizes the essence of what is
involved when both sides can make commitments.
In this model, the set U of feasible utility pairs is assumed to be convex,
closed, and bounded above, and to have a non-empty interior. A point q E U is
designated as the status quo. The two players simultaneously make
take-it-or-leave-it demands ul and u2 . If u e U, each receives his demand.
Otherwise each gets his status quo payoff.
Any point of V - (u a q: u is Pareto-efficient in U) is a Nash equilibrium.
Other equilibria result in disagreement. Nash [1953] dealt with this
indeterminacy by introducing a precursor of modern refinement ideas. He
assumed some shared uncertainty about the location of the frontier of U
embodied in a quasi-concave, differentiable function p: i2 - [0,1] such that
p(u) > 0 if u is in the interior of U and p(u) - 0 if u 0 U. One interprets
p(u) as the probability that the players commonly assign to the event u e U.
The modified model is called the smoothed Nash demand game. Interest centers
on the case in which the amount of uncertainty in the smoothed game is small.
For all small enough e > 0, choose a function p - p' such that p'(u) - 1 for
all u e U whose distance from V exceeds e. The existence of a Nash
equilibrium which leads to agreement with positive probability for the
smoothed Nash demand game for p - p' follows from the observation that the
maximizer of ulu 2p'(u 1 ,u2) is such a Nash equilibrium.
Result 4 (Nash, 1953) Let u' be a Nash equilibrium of the smoothed Nash demand
game associated with the function p' which leads to agreement with positive
probability. When e +0, u* converges to the Nash bargaining solution for the
problem (U,q).
Proof. The following sketch follows Binmore [1987c). Player i seeks to
maximize ugp'(u) + q (1 - p'(u)). The first order conditions for u' > q to be
a Nash equilibrium are therefore
(6) (u - qi)p (u') + p'(u') - 0 (1 - 1,2)
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where pi is the partial derivative of p' with respect to ui. Suppose that
p(u') - c > 0. From condition (6) it follows that the vector u' must be a
maximizer of H(u ,u2 ) - (ui - q1)(u - q2 ) subject to the constraint that
p(u) - c. Let w be the maximizer of H(u1 ,u2 ) subject to the constraint that
p(u) - 1. Then H(u') ? H(w'). By the choice of p' the sequence w' converges
to the Nash bargaining solution and therefore the sequence u' converges to the
Nash bargaining solution as well.
There has been much recent interest in the Nash demand game with incomplete
information, in which context it is referred to as a "sealed-bid,
double-auction" (see for example Wilson [1987a,b), Leininger/Linhart/Radner
[1986], Matthews/Postlewaite [1987]). It is therefore worth noting that the
smoothing technique carries over to the case of incomplete information and
provides a noncooperative defense of the Harsanyi and Selten [1972] axiomatic
characterization of the (M + N)-player asymmetric Nash bargaining solution in
which the bargaining powers #i (i - 1,.. , M) are the- (commonly known)
probabilities that player 2 attributes to player l's being of type i and #
(j - M + 1,... ,M + N) are the probabilities attributed by player 1 to player
2's being of type j. If attention is confined to pooling equilibria in the
smoothed demand game, the predicted deal a e A is the maximizer of
Hi-,..,M(O1(a) ) 3-1 Hl+, .,M+N(j(a))id. Here #i: A -+ 1 is the von Neumann and
Morgenstern utility function of the player of type i (Binmore, [1987c]).
Nash's threat game
In the Nash demand game, the status quo q is given. Nash [1953) extended his
model in an attempt to endogenize the choice of q. In this later model, the
underlying reality is seen as a finite two-person game G. The bargaining
activity begins with each player making a binding threat as to the (possibly
mixed) strategy for G that he will use if agreement is not reached in the
negotiations that follow. The ensuing negotiations consist simply of the Nash
demand game being played. If the latter is appropriately smoothed, the choice
of threats ti and t 2 at the first stage serves to determine a status quo
q(t 1 , t 2 ) for the use of the Nash bargaining solution at the second stage. The
players can write contracts specifying the use of lotteries, and hence we
identify the set U of feasible deals with the convex hull of the set of payoff
pairs available in G when this is played noncooperatively. This analysis
generates a reduced game in which the payoff pair n(t) that results from the
choice of the strategy profile t is the Nash bargaining solution for U
relative to the status quo q(t).
Result 5 (Nash, 1953) The Nash threat game has an equilibrium, and all
equilibria yield the same agreement in U.
The threat game is strictly competitive in that the players' preferences over
the possible outcomes are diametrically opposed. The result is therefore
related to von Neumann' s maximin theorem for two-person zero-sum games . In
particular, the equilibrium strategies are the players' security strategies
and the equilibrium outcome gives each player his security level. For a
further discussion of the Nash threat game, see Owen [1982).
The model described above, together with Nash' s [1953] axiomatic defense of
the same result, is often called his variable threats theory. The earlier
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model, in which q is given, is then called the fixed threat theory and q
itself is called the threat point. It needs to be remembered, in appealing to
either theory, that the threats need to have the character of conditional
commitments for the conclusions to be meaningful.
The Harsanyi-Zeuthen model
In what Harsanyi [1977] calls the "compressed Zeuthen model", the first stage
consists of Nash's simple demand game (with no smoothing). If the opening
demands are incompatible, a second stage is introduced in which the players
simultaneously decide whether to concede or to hold out. If both concede,
they each get only what their opponent offered them. If both hold out, they
get their status quo payoffs, which we normalize to be zero.
The concession subgame has three Nash equilibria. Harsanyi [1977] ingeniously
marshals a collection of "semi-cooperative" rationality principles in defense
of the use of Zeuthen's [1930] principle in making a selection from these -
three equilibria. Denoting by ri the ratio between i's utility gain if j
concedes and i's utility loss if there is disagreement, Zeuthen's principle is
that, if ri > rj, then player i concedes. When translated into familiar
terms, this calls for the selection of the equilibrium at which the Nash
product of the payoffs is biggest. When this selection is made in the
concession subgames, the equilibrium pair of opening demands is then simply
the Nash bargaining solution.
The full Harsanyi-Zeuthen model envisages, not one sudden-death encounter, but
a sequence of concessions over small amounts. However, the strategic
situation is very similar and the final conclusion concerning the
implementation of the Nash bargaining solution is identical.
Raking commitments stick.
Crawford [1982] offers what can be seen as an elaboration of the compressed
Harsanyi-Zeuthen model with a more complicated second stage in which making a
concession (backing down from the "commitment") is costly to an extent that is
uncertain at the time the original demands are made. He finds not only that
impasse can occur with positive probability, but that this probability need
not decrease as commitment is made more costly.
More recent work has concentrated on incomplete information about preferences
as an explanation of disagreement between rational bargainers (see Section 7).
In consequence, Schelling's [1960] view of bargaining as a "struggle to
establish commitments to favorable bargaining positions" remains largely
unexplored as regards formal modeling.
5. Pairvise bargaining with fey agents
In many economic environments, the parameters of one bargaining problem are
determined by the forecast outcomes of other bargaining problems. In such
situations, the result of the bargaining is highly sensitive to the detailed
structure of the institutional framework that governs how and when agents can
communicate with each other. The literature on this topic remains exploratory
at this stage, concentrating on a few examples with a view to isolating the
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crucial institutional features. We examine subgame-perfect equilibria of some
elaborations of the model of Section 2.
One seller and two buyers.
An indivisible good is owned by a seller S whose reservation value is vs - 0.
It may be sold to one and only one of two buyers, H and L, with reservation
values v - v? -vL - 1. In the language of cooperative game theory, we have a
three-player game with value function V satisfying V((S,H)) - V((S,H,L)) - v,
V((S,L)) - 1, and V(C) - 0 otherwise. The game has a non-empty core in
which the object is sold to H for a price p ? 1 when v > 1. (When v - 1, it
may be sold to either of the buyers at the price p - 1.) The Shapley value is
(1/6 + v/2, v/2 - 1/3, 1/6) (where the payoffs are given is the order S, H,
L).
How instructive are such conclusions from cooperative theory? The following
noncooperative models are intended to provide some insight. In these models,
if the object changes hands at price p at time t, then the seller gets pat and
the successful buyer -gets (v 1 - p)5t, where v5 is his valuation and 0 < 6 <
1. An agent who does not participate in a transaction gets zero. Information
is always perfect.
a. "Auctioning" [Binmore, 1985; Wilson, 1985]
The seller begins at time 0 by announcing a price, which both buyers hear.
Buyer H either accepts the offer, in which case he trades with the seller and
the game ends, or rejects it.. In the latter case, buyer L then either accepts
or rejects the seller's offer. If both buyers reject the offer, then there
is a delay of length r, after which both buyers simultaneously announce
counter-offers; the seller may either accept one of these offers or reject
both. If both are rejected then there is a delay of length r, after which the
seller makes a new offer; and so on.
b. "Telephoning" [Binmore, 1985]
The seller begins by choosing a buyer to call. During their conversation, the
seller and buyer alternate in making offers, a delay of length r elapsing
after each rejection. Whenever it is the seller's turn to make an offer, he
can hang up, call the other buyer and make an offer to him instead. An
excluded buyer is not allowed to interrupt the seller's conversation with the
other buyer.
c. "Random matching" [Rubinstein/Wolinsky, 1986))
At the beginning of each period, the seller is randomly matched with one of
the two buyers with equal probability. Each member of a matched pair then has
an equal chance of getting to make a proposal which the other can then accept
or refuse. If the proposal is rejected, the whole process is repeated after a
period of length r has elapsed.
d. "Acquiring property rights" [Gul, 1989]
The players may acquire property rights originally vested with other players.
An individual who has acquired the property rights of all members of the
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coalition C enjoys an income of V(C) while he remains in possession. Property
rights may change hands as a consequence of pairwise bargaining. In each
period, any pair of agents retaining property rights has an equal chance of
being chosen to bargain. Each of the matched pair then has an equal chance of
getting to make a proposal to the other about the rate at which he is willing
to rent the property rights of the other. If the responder agrees, he leaves
the game and the remaining player enjoys the income derived from coalescing
the property rights of both. If the responder refuses, both are returned to
the pool of available bargainers. In this model, a strategy is to be
understood as stationary if the behavior for which it calls depends only on
the current distribution of property rights and not explicitly on time or
other variables.
Result 6
(a) [Bimmore, 1985] If, in the auctioning model, 1 < v s 2 and~ 6' > 1/v, or
v - 1, then there is a subgame-perfect equilibrium, and in all such equilibria
the goodis sold immediately (to H if v > 1) at the price 6' + (1 - 6')v. If
v > 2 and v is sufficiently small, then the only subgame-perfect equilibrium
outcome is that the good is sold to H at the-bilateral bargaining price (of
approximately v/2) that would obtain if L were absent altogether.
(b) [Binnre, 1985] For the telephoning model, if v > 1, in any subgame-
perfect equilibrium immediate agreement is reached on the bilateral bargaining
price (approximately v/2 when r is small) that would obtain if L were absent
altogether. If v > 1 then the good is sold to H.
(c) [Rubinstein/Volinsky, 1986] For the random matching model when v - 1,
there is unique subgame-perfect equilibrium in which the good is sold to the
first matched buyer (an inefficient outcome) for a price that is approximately
1 when r is small. (The case v > 1 has not been analyzed yet).
(d) [GuI, 1989] For the acquiring property rights model, among the class of
stationary subgame-perfect equilibria there is a unique equilibrium, in which
all matched pairs reach immediate agreement. When r is small, this
equilibrium assigns each player an expected income approximately equal to his
Shapley value allocation.
Remark Some of the above results are valid for more general cooperative games
(see for example Jun [1987)). Gul's result is valid for all cooperative games
with a strictly superadditive value function. For a distinct but related
implementation of the Shapley value, see Dow [1989]. For a very different
"semi-cooperative" interpretation of the Shapley value, see Harsanyi [1977].
Horn and Wolinsky [1986, 1988] have analyzed a three player cooperative game
in which V(1,2,3) > V(1,2) - V(1,3) > 0 and for all other coalitions C we have
V(C) - 0. In this case, the game does not end as soon as one agreement is
reached and the question of whether the first agreement is implemented
immediately becomes an important factor. (Related work appears in Jun (1989]
and Chae/Yang [1988]).
6. Bargaining in markets
Bargaining theory provides a natural framework within which to study price
formation in markets where transactions are made in a decentralized manner via
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interaction between pairs of agents rather than being organized centrally
through the use of a formal trading institution like an auctioneer. One might
describe the aim of investigations in this area as that of providing
"mini-micro" foundations for the micro-economic analysis of markets and, in
particular, to determine the range of validity of the Walrasian paradigm.
Such a program represents something of a challenge for game theorists in that
its success will presumably generate new solution concepts for market
situations intermediate between those developed for bilateral bargaining and
the notion of a Walrasian equilibrium.
Early studies of matching and bargaining models are Diamond [1981], Mortensen
(1982a, b] and Diamond/Maskin [1979] in which bargaining is modeled using
cooperative game theory. This approach is to be contrasted with the
noncooperative approach of the models that follow. A pioneering paper in this
direction is that of Butters [1977].
The models that exist differ in-their treatment of several key issues. First,
there is the information structure. What does a player know about the events
in other bargaining sessions? Second, there is the question of the detailed
structure of the pairwise bargaining games. In particular, when can a player
opt out? Third, there is the modeling of the search technology through which
the bargainers get matched. Finally, there is the nature of the data given
about agents in the market. Sometimes, for example, it relates to stocks of
agents in the market, and sometimes to flows of entrants or potential
entrants. -
Markets in steady state [Rubinstein/Wolinsky, 1985]
Most of the literature has concentrated on a market for an indivisible good in
which agents are divided into two groups, sellers and buyers. All the sellers
have reservation value 0 for the good and all the buyers have reservation
value 1. A matched seller and buyer can agree on any price p with 0 s p s 1.
If agreement is reached at time t, then the seller leaves the market with a
von Neumann and Morgenstern utility of pt .and. the buyer leaves with
(1 - p) 6 *.
The first event in each period is a matching session in which all agents in
the market participate, including those who may be matched already. Any
seller has a probability a of being matched with a buyer and any buyer has a
probability # of being matched with a seller. The numbers a and $ are assumed
to be constant so that the economic environment remains in a steady state.
Bargaining can take place only between individuals in a matched pair. After
the matching session, each member of a matched pair is equally likely to be
chosen to make the first offer. This may be accepted or rejected by the
proposer's partner. If it is accepted, both leave the market. In either
case, the next period commences after time r has elapsed.
Pairs who are matched at time t but do not reach agreement remain matched at
time t + r, unless one or both partners get matched elsewhere. In the model,
an agent m~ust. abandon his old partner when matched with a new one. Thus, for
example, a seller with a partner at time t who does not reach agreement at
time t, has probability (1 - o)p of being without a partner at time t + r. (A
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story can be told about the circumstances under which it would always be
optimal to abandon the current partner if this decision were the subject of
strategic choice, but this issue is neglected here.)
The model is not a game in the strict sense. For example, the set of players
is not specified. Nevertheless, a game-theoretic analysis makes sense using a
solution concept that is referred to as a "market equilibrium". This is a
pair of strategies, one for buyers and one for sellers, that satisfies:
1. semi-stationarity The strategies prescribe the same bargaining tactics for
all buyers (or sellers) independently of their personal histories.
2. sequential rationality The strategies are optimal after all possible
histories.
Result 7 (Rubinstein/Volinsky, 1985) There is a unique market equilibrium. As
r + 0+, the price at which the good changes hands converges to a/(a + #).
The probabilities a and # depend on the matching technology which depends in
turn on how search is modeled. - Let S and B be the steady-state measures of
sellers and buyers respectively, and consider-the most naive of search models
in which a - cr[B/(S + B)] and $ - cr[S/(B + S)], where the constant c
represents a "search friction". In the limit as r - 0+, the market
equilibrium price approaches B/(B + S). Thus, for example, if there are few
sellers and many buyers, the price is high.
Notice that the short side of the market does not appropriate the entire
surplus evenin the case when search frictions become negligible. Gale [1987]
points out that, if this conclusion seems paradoxical, it is as a consequence
of thinking of supply and demand in terms of the stocks S and B of agents in
the market at any time. To keep the market in a steady-state, the flows of
buyers and sellers into the market at any time have to be equal. If supply
and demand are measured in terms of these flows, then any selling price is
Walrasian. For further discussion, see Rubinstein [1987, 1989].
Unsteady states [Binnore/Berrero, 1988a, b]
Binmore and Herrero [1988a,b] generalize the preceding model in two
directions. The informational difficulties finessed by Rubinstein and
Wolinsky's "semi-stationarity" condition are tackled by observing that
subgame-perfect equilibria in alternating-offers models can be replaced by
"security equilibria" without losing the uniqueness conclusion. A security
equilibrium is related to the notion of "rationalizability" introduced by
Bernheim [1984] and Pearce [1984]. Their requirement about its being common
knowledge that strictly dominated strategies are never played, is replaced by
a similar requirement concerning security levels. It is assumed to be common
knowledge that no player takes an action under any contingency that yields
less than he calculates his security level-to be given the occurrence of the
contingency. _Any equilibrium notion normally considered is also a security
equilibrium. A proof of uniqueness for security equilibria therefore entails
uniqueness for more conventional equilibria also. However, in markets with a
continuum of traders, security equilibria are insensitive to the players'
personal histories. The immediate point is that stationarity restrictions on
the equilibrium concept used in the Rubinstein/Wolinsky model and its
relatives are not crucial in obtaining a uniqueness result (provided 6 < 1).
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The second generalization of the Rubinstein/Wolinsky model results from
applying the technique to markets which are not necessarily in a steady-state
in that the equilibrium measures of traders may vary with time as a
consequence of satisfied traders leaving the market without there being an
exactly counterbalancing inflow of new traders. Closed-form conclusions are
obtained for the continuous time case obtained by considering the limit as r -+
0+. In particular, the equilibrium deal can be expressed as an integral
involving the equilibrium probabilities that a buyer or a seller is matched at
all future times.
Aside from the steady-state model, the simplest special case occurs when no
new traders enter the market after time 0. There is then no replacement of
those traders present at time 0 when they finally conclude a successful deal
and leave the market. With the naive search technology considered in the
Rubinstein/Wolinsky model, the following Wairasian conclusion may be obtained:
Result 8 (Binwnre/Herrero, 1988a,b) There is a unique security equilibrium.
As search frictions become negligible, the equilibrium deal approximates that
in which the entire surplus is assigned to agents on the short side of the
market.
Among many other results, Gale [1987] has extended versions of both Results 7
and 8 to the case in which there is a spectrum of reservation prices on both
sides of the market.
Divisible goods with multiple trading [Gale, 1986c]
Gale [1986a, b, c] studies traditional barter markets in which many divisible
goods are traded and agents can transact many times before leaving the market.
We now describe one of the models from Gale [1986c] (which is a simplification
of the earlier paper Gale [1986a]). The existence of market equilibrium was
established in Gale [1986b]. The relation between Gale's work and general
equilibrium theory is explored in McLennan/Sonnenschein (1989).
All agents, of which there are K types, enter the market at time zero.
Initially, there is a measure nk of agents of each type k - 1,2,...;K. An
agent of type k is characterized by his initial commodity bundle wk and his
utility function uk:I U (D) -+ R U (--o), where g is the space of commodity
bundles with which he might leave the market and D is the event of his
remaining in the market for ever. Agents are not impatient (8 - 1) and
bundles may be stored costlessly.
Each period begins with a matching session which operates independently of
past events. In particular, no matches survive from previous periods. The
probability of a given agent getting matched with an agent with specified
characteristics is proportional to the current measure of such agents in the
population. Once a match is established, each of the paired players learns
the type of his partner and his partner's commodity bundle. Bargaining then
begins. Each member of a matched pair is equally likely to be chosen to make
a proposal. This must consist of a vector representing a feasible transfer of
goods from himself to his bargaining partner. This proposal may be accepted
or rejected. If it is rejected, the responding player then decides whether or
not to leave the market. An important assumption is that players do not leave
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the market except after such a rejection.
As trade occurs, the bundle held by each agent changes. Given the
restrictions on strategies imposed below, the number of different bundles held
is always finite. Thus, in any period the state of the market can be
characterized by a finite list (ci, k1 , vi), where ci is a feasible holding and
vi is the measure of agents of type k1 holding ci.
A market equilibrium is defined to be a K-tuple of strategies, one for each
type, which satisfies the following conditions:
1. semi-stationarity The bargaining tactics prescribed by the strategy depend
only on time, the agent's current bundle and the opponent's type and
current bundle.
2. sequential rationality Whenever an agent makes a decision, the strategy
calls for an optimal decision, given the strategies of the other types and
the current state of the market.
The definition is closely related to the notion of sequential equilibrium with
"passive conjectures".
A K-tuple of bundles (x 1 , ... , x.) is an allocation if Enxk - Inkwk. If there
exists a price vector p such that, for all k, the bundle xk maximizes uk
subject to the budget constraint px s pwk, then the allocation is Walrasian.
Gale's concern is with the circumstances under which the equilibrium outcome
is Walrasian.
For technical reasons, Gale restricts the utility functions to be considered.
Here (as in the presentation in Osborne and Rubinstein [1990]) we require the
existence of an increasing and continuous function 4k:R -, R which is zero on
the boundary of RT and strictly concave in its interior. For a given 0 > 0,
it is then required that
ux- 4(x) if #k(x) 4
uk(X)mm{
-CO otherwise.
In addition, some regularity conditions have to be imposed on the indifference
curves. It is sufficient, for example, that 4k have a uniformly continuous
derivative.
Result 9 (Gale 1986a, b) For every market equilibrium, there is a Walrasian
allocation (x1 , ... ,x,) such that each agent of type k leaves the market
holding bundle xk with probability one.
The constraint that the strategies have to be semi-stationary may reflect an
assumption about the information available to the players . The role of the
informational structure in such models is explored in Rubinstein/Wolinsky
[1986]. In particular, it is shown that, in a model with 6 - 1 and a finite
number of traders, any price can be supported as a sequential equilibrium,
provided that players are permitted perfect knowledge of the events in the
market or even if the players are able to recall only their personal
histories.
Notes Other related works include Shaked/Sutton (1984] which aims to explain
involuntary unemployment with a stylized model of the labor market. Wolinsky
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[1987a] makes the intensity with which agents search an endogenous variable.
(See also Bester [1988], Chikte/Deshmukh (1985] and Muthoo [1988) on this
latter topic.) Wolinsky (1988] analyzes the case in which transactions are
made by auction, rather than by matching and bargaining.
A very challenging issue is that of extending the models to include asymmetric
information. A pioneering work in this direction is Wolinsky [1987b]. In
Wolinsky's model the equilibrium outcome of a decentralized trading process
may not approximate the rational expectations equilibrium of the corresponding
trading process, even when the market is "approximately frictionless". For
related models see Rosenthal/Landau [1981) and Samuelson [1987].
7. Bargaining with incomplete information
This section presents some attempts to build theories of bargaining when the
information available to the bargainers about their opponents is incomplete.
The proposals and responses in an alternating-offers model then do more than
register a player's willingness to settle on a particular deal: they also
serve as signals by means of which the players may communicate information to
each other about their private characteristics. Such signals need not be
"truthful". A player in a weak bargaining position may find it worthwhile to
imitate the bargaining behavior that he would use if he were strong with a
view to getting the same deal as a strong player would get. A strong player
must therefore consider whether or not to choose a bargaining strategy that it
would be too costly for a weak player to imitate lest the opponent fail to
recognize that he is strong. Such issues are studied in the literature on
signalling games (Chapter ?) which is therefore central to what follows.
A central goal in studying bargaining with incomplete information is to
explain the delays in reaching agreement that we observe in real-life
bargaining. (Recall that the alternating-offers model of Result 1, in which
information is complete, predicts no delay at all). Much has been learned in
pursuing this goal, but its attainment remains elusive. In this section, we
propose to do no more than indicate the scope of the difficulties as currently
seen.
The literature uses the Kreps/Wilson [1982] notion of a sequential equilibrium
after reducing the bargaining situation with incomplete information to a game
with imperfect information in accordance with Harsanyi's [1967/68] theory,
within which each player is seen as being chosen by a chance move from a set
of "types" of player that he might have been. Although subgame-perfection is
a very satisfactory concept for complete information bargaining games, the set
of sequential equilibria for bargaining games with incomplete information is
typically enormously large. It is therefore necessary, if informative results
are to emerge, to refine the notion of sequential equilibrium. Progress in
the study of bargaining games of incomplete information, as with signalling
games in general, is therefore closely tied to developments in the literature
on refinements of sequential equilibrium. It should be noted, however, that
advances in refinement theory have only a tentative character. Although one
idea or another may seem intuitively plausible in a particular context, the
theory lacks any firmly grounded guiding principles. Until these problems in
the foundations of game theory are better understood, it therefore seems
premature to advocate any of the proposed resolutions of the problem of
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bargaining under incomplete information for general use in economic theory.
An alternating-offers model with incomplete information [Rubinstein, 1985ab]
We return to the problem of "dividing the dollar" in which the set of feasible
agreements is identified with A - [0,1]. For simplicity, we confine attention
to the case of fixed costs per unit time of delay. Recall that the players'
preferences over the possible deals (a,t), in which 1 gets a and 2 gets 1 - a
at time t, may then be represented by a - clt and 1 - a - c2t, where ci > 0
(i - 1,2). Player l's cost c1 - c per unit time of delay is taken to be
common knowledge, but 2's cost c2 is known for certain only by 2. It is
common knowledge only that player 1 initially believes that c2 must take one
of the two values cw or cs and that the probability of the former is xw. It
is assumed that cs < c < cw and the costs are small enough that c + cw + cs <
1. The interval between successive proposals is fixed at r - 1 except where
otherwise noted.
Having a high cost rate is a source of weakness in one's bargaining position.
For example, if we - 1, so that it is certain that 2 has a higher cost rate
than 1, then we have seen that 1 gets the entire surplus in equilibrium. On
the other hand, if we - 0, so that it is certain that 2 has a lower cost rate
than 1, then 1 gets only cs. For this reason, a high cost type of 2 is said
to be weak and a low cost type to be strong.
In the context of this model, a sequential equilibrium is a strategy triple,
one for player 1 and one each for the two possible types of player 2, combined
with a belief function which assigns, to every possible history after which
player 1 has to move, the probability that player 1 attaches to the event that
player 2 is weak. The beliefs have to be updated using Bayes' Rule whenever
this is possible, and the initial belief has to be rw. The strategy of each
player must be optimal after every history (sequential rationality). We
impose two auxiliary requirements. First, if the probability that player 1
attaches to the -event that player 2 is weak is zero (one) for some history, it
remains zero (one) subsequently. Thus, once player 1 is convinced of the
identity of his opponent, he is never dissuaded of this view. Second, player
1 never changes his belief in response to a deviation by himself.
As is shown in Rubinstein [1985a,b], many sequential equilibria may exist:
1. If 2c/(c + cw) < rw then in all sequential equilibria player l's expected
payoff is at least xw + (1 - ww)(1 - cw - c).
2. If 2c/(c + cw) ? - , then, for any a* between c and 1 - c - cs, there
exists a ("pooling") sequential equilibrium in which both a weak and a
strong player 2 accept an opening demand of a* by player 1.
3. If 2c/(c + cw) >- (c + cs)/(c + cw), then, for any a* c there exists
a ("separating") sequential equilibrium in which a weak player 2 accepts
the opening demand of a* by player 1, but a strong player 2 rejects this
demand and makes a counter-offer of a* - cg, which player 1 accepts.
The multiplicity of equilibria arises because of the freedom permitted by the
concept of sequential equilibrium in attributing beliefs to players after they
have observed a deviation from equilibrium. Such deviations are zero
probability events and so cannot be dealt with by Bayesian updating.
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We illustrate the ideas underlying these results by considering case (2). Let
1 - c - cs z a* z c. We construct a sequential equilibrium in terms of two
commonly held states-of-mind labeled I (for initial) and 0 (for optimistic).
In state I, it is common knowledge that 1 believes that 2 is weak with
probability w . In state 0, it is common knowledge that 1 believes that 2 is
weak for sure. The players continue in state I until there is a deviation by
2 after which they switch to state 0. The transition occurs immediately after
player 2 makes an offer, before player 1 responds. Once in state 0, they
remain there no matter what. (These conjectures are called "optimistic".
They are useful in rendering deviations unattractive and hence in constructing
multiple equilibria.) Player 1 and the weak type of player 2 behave is state
0 precisely as in the complete information case when it is certain that 2 has
the high cost rate c; the strong type of player 2 uses a best response
against player l's strategy. In state I:
1. Player 1 demands a* and accepts an offer of a if and only if a e a* - c.
2. A strong player 2 offers a* - c and accepts only a demand of a s a*.
3. A weak player 2 offers a* - c and accepts only a demand of a < a* - c +
cw.
Some comments on why the parameters need to be restricted in order to sustain
the equilibrium may be helpful. Notice that, if I demands more than a* and
less than a* - c + cw at time 0, then he remains in state I and expect less
than ,rw(a* - c + cw) + (1 - rw)(a* - c - c). The condition that this quantity
not exceed a* is that 2c/(c + c) we. The requirement that a* z c is simply
to ensure that the offer a* - c be feasible. Finally, observe that the reason
that it is optimal for a strong 2 to accept an opening demand of a* is that
1 - a* 2 c - cs. The latter quantity is what 2 gets by refusing. (The state
shifts to 0, in which player 1 believes he faces a weak opponent. The strong
type of player 2 therefore makes, at time , - 1, an offer of c which 1
accepts. His expected payoff from the refusal is therefore c - cs.)
Prolonged disagreement
Case 2 from the preceding subsection is now used to construct a sequential
equilibrium in which the bargaining may be prolonged for many periods before
agreement is achieved.
Choose three numbers x*, y* and z* which satisfy c s x* < y* < z* s
1 - c + cs. The time that elapses in equilibrium before agreement is reached
is denoted by N, where N is chosen to be the largest even integer smaller than
min((y* - x*)/c, (z* -y* + c - c)/cw, (z* -y* + cs - c)/cs)-
Until the Nth period, player 1 and both types of player 2 are required to
hold out for the entire surplus. The players switch to a sequential
equilibrium as described in case 2 of the previous subsection as follows:
(1) a* - x* if 1 deviates from the prescribed behavior during the first N
periods;
(2) a* - z*~ if 2 deviates during the first N periods;
(3) a* - y* if the N* period is reached without a deviation.
A switch occurs immediately after a deviation. The bound on N ensures that 1
does not deviate at time 0. The prescribed play yields a payoff of y* - Nc as
opposed to his best alternative, which is to demand x*. It also ensures that
a weak 2 does not deviate at the second period. The prescribed play yields a
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payoff of 1 - y* - Ncw as opposed to his best alternative, which is to offer
z* - c, whose acceptance yields a payoff of 1 - z* + c - c .
When the length of a period is r, the parameters c, cg and cw in the above
must be multiplied by r and the delay time to agreement becomes T - Nr. The
limit of the latter as r - 0+ is positive. Thus, there may be significant
delay in reaching agreement, even when r is small, although no information is
revealed along the equilibrium path after a deviation occurs. Any deviation
is interpreted as signalling weakness and leads to an equilibrium that favors
the non-deviant.
Gul and Sonnenschein [1988] do not accept that such non-stationary equilibria
are reasonable. In this context, stationarity refers to the assumption that
players do not change their behavior so long as 1 does not change his belief
about 2's type. A version of their result for the fixed costs model that we
have been using as an example is that any sequential equilibrium in which 2's
strategies are stationary must lead to an agreement no later than the second
period.
In their paper, Gul- and Sonnenschein analyze a more complex bargaining model
between-a seller and a buyer in which the seller's reservation value is 0 and
the buyer's reservation value has a continuous distribution F with support
(1, h]. They impose two properties in addition to stationarity on sequential
equilibrium. The Monotonicity property requires that, for histories after
which the seller's posterior distribution for the buyer's reservation value is
the conditional distribution of F given [1, x], the seller's offer must be
increasing in x. The No Free Screening property requires that the buyer's
offer can influence the seller's beliefs only after histories in which at
least one of the buyer's equilibrium offers is supposed to be accepted by the
seller.
Result 10 (Gul/Sormenschein, 1988) For all e > 0 there is r* > 0 such that
for all positive r < r*, in every sequential equilibrium which satisfies
stationarity, monotonicity and no free screening, the probability that
bargaining continues after time e is at most e.
Gul and Sonnenschein conclude from Result 10 that bargaining with one-sided
uncertainty leads to vanishingly small delays when the interval between
successive proposals becomes sufficiently small. We are not convinced that
such a sweeping conclusion is legitimate, although we do not deny that actual
delays in real-life bargaining must often be caused by factors that are more
complex than the uncertainties about the tastes or beliefs of a player as we
have modeled them. Uncertainties about how rational or irrational an opponent
is are probably at least as important. The reason for our skepticism lies in
the fact that, as is shown by Ausubel and Deneckere [1989] and others, the
result relies heavily on the stationarity assumption. As explained in Section
2, stationarity assumptions do more than attribute simplicity of behavior to
the players: they also make players' beliefs insensitive to past events.
Note that Result 10 and that of Gul/Sonnenschein/Wilson [1986] have an
importance beyond bargaining theory because of their significance for the
"Coase conjecture". Note also that Vincent (1987] demonstrates that, if the
seller and the buyer have correlated valuations for the traded item, then
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delay is possible when the time between offers goes to zero even under
stationarity assumptions.
Ref inements of sequential equilibrium in bargaining nodels
[Rubinstein 1985a,b]
Our study of the fixed costs model shows that the concept of sequential
equilibrium needs to be refined if unique equilibrium outcomes are to be
obtained. To motivate the refinement that we propose, consider the following
situation. Player 1 makes a demand of a which is rejected by 2 who makes a
counter-offer of b, where a - cw < b < a - cs. If the rejection and the
counter-offer are out of equilibrium, then the sequential equilibrium concept
does not preclude 1 from assigning probability one to the event that 2 is
weak. Is this reasonable? Observe that 2 rejects the demand a in favor an
offer of b which, if accepted, leads to a payoff of 1 - b - es > 1 - a for
the strong 2, but only 1 - b - cw < 1 - a for the weak 2. One can therefore
"rationalize" the offer of b on the part of the strong player but not-on the
part of the weak player. Should not this offer therefore convince 1 that his
opponent is strong?
The next result, which is a version of Rubinstein [1985a,b], explores the
hypothesis that players' beliefs incorporate such "rationalizations" about
their opponents. The precise requirements for rationalizing conjectures are
that, in any history after which player 1 is not certain that he faces the
weak type of player 2:
1. If 2 rejects the offer a and makes a counter-offer b satisfying a - c, <
b < a-- cs, then 1 assigns probability one to the event that his opponent
is strong.
2. If 2 rejects the offer a and makes a counter-offer b satisfying a - es >
b, then 1 does not increase the probability he attaches to 2's being
strong.
Result 11 (Rubinstein, 1985a,b) For any sequential equilibrium with
rationalizing conjectures:
1. If xw > 2c/(c + c) then if 2 is weak there is an immediate agreement in
which 1 gets the entire surplus, while if 2 is strong the agreement is
delayed by one period, at which time 1 gets 1 - cw.
2. If (c + cs)/(c + c) < x< 2c/(c + c) then if 2 is weak there is an
immediate agreement in which 1 gets cw, while if 2 is strong the agreement
is delayed by one period, at which time 1 gets nothing at all.
3. If aw < (c + cs)/(c + c) then there is an immediate agreement in which I
gets cs whatever 2's type.
Rubinstein [1985a] provides a more general result applied to the family of
time preferences explored in section 2. Various refinements of a similar
nature have been proposed by numerous authors. In particular, Grossman and
Perry [1986] propose a refinement they call "perfect sequential equilibrium"
which seems to lead to plausible outcomes in bargaining models for which it
exists.
Strategic delay [Admati/Perry, 19873
One may modify the previous model by allowing a responding player to choose
how much time may pass before he makes his counter-offer. He may either
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immediately accept the proposal with which he is currently faced or he may
refuse the demand and choose a pair (a,A), where a e A is his
counter-proposal and A r is the length of the delay during which no player
may make a new offer. (Without incomplete information, this modification has
no bite. In equilibrium, each player minimizes the delay and chooses A - 7.)
The refinement of sequential equilibrium described here (which is somewhat
stronger than that offered by Admati/Perry [1987]) is similar to that of the
preceding section:
1. After any history that does not convince 1 that 2 is weak for sure, suppose
that 1 demands a and that this demand is rejected by 2 who then counters
with an offer of b after a delay of A i v. If 1 - b - cu < 1 - a s 1 -
b - csA, then 1 concludes that 2 is strong for sure.
2. Suppose that 1 is planning to accept an offer a if this is delayed by a but
that 2 delays a further d > 0 before making an offer b satisfying 1 - b -
cwd < 1 - a < 1 - b - csd. Then, whatever the previous history, 1
concludes that 2 is strong for sure.
For 2c/(c + cw) < ng, Admati/Perry [1987] show that any sequential equilibrium
satisfying these additional assumptions has player 1 demanding the entire
surplus at time 0. A weak player 2 accepts, but a strong player 2 rejects and
makes a counter-offer of 0 after a delay of 1/cw which player 1 accepts.
The result is to be compared with case 1 of Result 11 in which agreement is
delayed by a vanishingly small amount when r + 0+. Here, the delay in
reaching agreement when 2 is strong does not depend on r, and hence the delay
persists in the limiting case as r + 0+. (The constraint on rw is necessary.
See Admati/Perry [1987] for details.)
Other results
Strategic sequential bargaining models with incomplete information are
surveyed by Cramton [1984], by Wilson [1987c], and by several contributors to
Roth [1985]. We have dealt only with one-sided uncertainty. Cramton [1988]
constructs a sequential equilibrium for the alternating offers model with
two-sided uncertainty.
Bikhchandani [1985] points out that the sensitivity of the results on
prolonged disagreement to certain changes in the bargaining procedure and in
the solution concept employed. Perry [1986] seeks to endogenize the choice of
the initial proposer.
The complexity of the analysis is reduced substantially if only two possible
agreements are available; sharp results can then be obtained. See
Chatterjee/Samuelson (1987]. Notice that this case is strongly related to
games of attrition as studied in other game-theoretic contexts.
Finally, it has to be emphasized that many of the issues in bargaining with
incomplete information that we have studied in this paper also arise in models
in which only the uninformed party is allowed to make offers. For a
presentation of such a model see, for example, Fudenberg/Levine/Tirole [1985).
S. Bargaining and Mechanism Design
The mechanism design literature regards a theory of bargaining as providing a
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mapping from the space of problem parameters to a solution to the bargaining
problem. Attention is focused on the mappings or mechanisms that satisfy
certain interesting properties, the aim being to study simultaneously the Nash
equilibria for a large class of bargaining games of incomplete information
without the need to specify each of the bargaining games in detail.
The rest of the section follows ideas appearing in the path-breaking paper of
Myerson and Satterthwaite [1983]. The idea is explained in the context of a
particularly simple case analyzed by Matsuo [1988].
A seller and a buyer of a single indivisible good have to negotiate a price.
Both buyer and seller may be strong or weak, it being common knowledge that
the prior probability of each possible pairing of types is the same. A
player's strength or weakness depends on his reservation value which may be
s, s 2 , b or bz, where 0 - sL < bl < s < b. We 'let s 2 - b1 +6 and assume that
b1 - s1 + e, and b2 - sz+ C.
A mechanism M in this context is a mapping that assigns an outcome to each
realization of (s,b). An outcome is a pair consisting of a price and a
probability. Thus a mechanism is a pair of functions (p, r). The
interpretation is that when the realization ia (s,b) then with probabilityw(s,b) agreement is reached on the price p(s,b), and with probability
1 - f(s,b) there is disagreement. The expected utility gain to a seller with
reservation value s from the use of the mechanism M is U(s) -
Eb1r(s,b)(p(s,b) - s). The expected utility gain to a buyer with reservation
utility b is V(b) - Ear(s,b)(b - p(s,b)).
Suppose that the buyer and the seller negotiate by choosing strategies in a
non-cooperative bargaining game. A mechanism M can then be constructed by
making a selection from the Nash equilibria of this game. It should be noted
that the restriction of the set of outcomes to consist of a price and a
probability significantly limits the scope of bargaining games to which the
current investigation is applicable.
If the bargaining game has the properties that each player's security level is
at least as large as his reservation value and that the action spaces are
independent of the type of a buyer or a seller, then the mechanism must
satisfy the following constraints:
Individual Rationality For all s and b we have U(s) z 0 and V(b) 2 0.
Incentive Compatibility For all s, s', b and b' we have
U(s) 2 Er(s',b)(p(s',b) - s) and V(b) Esw(s,b')(b - p(s,b')).
If the mechanism represents the outcome of a game, the second condition
asserts that no player prefers to use the strategy employed by another player.
(Note that we- are not necessarily discussing a direct mechanism and so the
strategies need not consist simply of an announcement of a player's type.
However, one could, of course, apply the "revelation principle" (Chapter ???)
and thereby study only direct mechanisms without loss of generality.)
An efficient mechanism is a mechanism which induces an agreement whenever a
surplus exists (i.e. b > s). In our example, a surplus exists except when a
low reservation value buyer confronts a high reservation value seller (i.e.
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s - s2 and b - b1).
We now explain why an efficient mechanism satisfying Individual Rationality
and Incentive Compatibility exists if and only if 2E z 6.
Assume first that 2E < 6. Let a(s) denote the probability with which a seller
with reservation value s reaches agreement. Let p8(b) be similarly defined for
buyers. The incentive compatibility constraints can then be rewritten as
(s2 - sl)a(s2) s U(s 1 ) - U(s 2 ) s (s2 - s1 )o(s 1 ) and (b2 - b1 )P(b 1 ) s V(b 2 ) -
V(b 1) s (b2 - b1 )$(b 2)."
If an efficient mechanism exists, then o(s 2 ) - B(bl) - 1/2. It follows that
U(s 1 ) 2 U(s 1 ) - U(s 2 ) 2Z(s2 - sl)/2 and V(b 2 ) z V(b 2) - V(b 1 ) z (b2 - b1)/2.
The sum of the expected gains to a strong buyer and a strong seller is then
U(s 1)/2 + V(b 2)/2 z (s2 - sl + b2 - b 1)/4 - (e + 6)/2, but the total expected
surplus is only [(b 2 - s1 ) + (b 2 - s2) + (b 1 - si) + 0]/4 - e + 6/4 < (e +
S)/2. No efficient mechanism can therefore exist.
Next, assume that 6 s 2e. We now construct a game in which there is a Nash
equilibrium that induces an efficient mechanism. In the game, the seller
announces either sl or s2 and the buyer announces either b1 or b2. The
following table indicates the prices (nga payoffs) that are then enforced (D
means disagreement).
b1 b2
s1 b1 (si + b2)/2
s2 D s2
This game has a Nash equilibrium in which all types tell the truth and in
which an efficient outcome is achieved. Notice in particular that if a weak
seller is honest and reports s1, he gets a payoff of (s1 + b2 + 2b1)/4, while
if he is dishonest and reports s2, he gets (sl + s2)/ 2 . But (s + b2 +
2b1 )/4 - (s 1 + s2)/2 - (2e - 6)/4 & 0.
U
The above example illustrates some of the ideas of Myerson/Satterthwaite
[1983]. They offer some elegant characterization results for incentive-
compatible mechanisms from which they are able to deduce a number of
interesting conclusions. In particular:
Result 12 (Nysrson/Satterthwaite, 1983) Let is h < s h. If s is
distributed with positive density over the interval [g, s] and b is
independently distributed with positive density over the interval [h, b], then
no incentive-compatible, individually rational mechanism is efficient.
Given this result, it is then natural to ask what can be said about the
mechanisms that maximize expected total gains from trade. The conclusion of
Myerson and Satterthwaite in the case when both s and b are uniformly
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distributed on [0,1] is a neat one: the expected gains from trade are
maximized by a mechanism that transfers the object if and only if b z s + 1/4.
Chatterjee and Samuelson [1983] had previously shown that the sealed-bid,
double auction, in which the object is sold to the buyer at the average of the
two bid prices whenever the buyer's bid exceeds the seller's, admits an
equilibrium in which this maximal gain from trade is achieved. (The seller
proposes the price 2s/3 + 1/4 and the buyer proposes 2b/3 + 1/12.)
The mechanism design approach is more general than that of noncooperative
bargaining theory with which this chapter has been mostly concerned. However,
the above mechanism design results, although wide in their scope of the
situations to which they apply, do no more than to classify scenarios in which
efficient outcomes are or are not achievable in equilibrium. Even when an
efficient outcome is achievable, it need not be the realized outcome in the
class of noncooperative games that is actually relevant in a particular
applied context. This trade-off between generality and immediate
applicability is one which we noted before in comparing cooperative and
noncooperative game theory. As in that case, the two approaches should be
seen as complementary, each providing -insights where the other .s silent.
9. Final Comments
In the past decade John Nash's [1950, 1953] pioneering work on noncooperative
bargaining theory has been taken up again and developed by numerous authors.
We see three directions in which progress has been particularly fruitful:
1. Sequential models have been introduced in studying specific bargaining
procedures.
2. Refinements of Nash equilibrium have been applied.
3. Bargaining models have been embedded in market situations to provide
insights into markets with decentralized trading.
In spite of this progress, important challenges are still ahead. The most
pressing is that of establishing a properly founded theory of bargaining under
incomplete information. A resolution of this difficulty must presumably await
a major breakthrough in the general theory of games of incomplete information.
From the perspective of economic theory in general, the main challenge remains
the modeling of trading institutions (with the nature of "money" the most
obvious target).
Because many of the results of noncooperative bargaining theory are relatively
recent, there are few sources of a general nature that can be recommended for
further reading. Harsanyi [1977) provides an interesting early analysis of
some of the topics covered in the chapter. Roth [1985] and Binmore/Dasgupta
(1987] are collections of papers the scope of which coincides with that of
this chapter. Sutton [1986] and Rubinstein [1987] are survey papers. Osborne
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